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The member states of the European Union (EU) and the EU institutions have increasingly 
been using public-private partnerships (PPPs) to accelerate the development of (ambitious) 
trans-national  infrastructure. This paper argues that in the EU (i) private sector partners 
remain risk-averse; and (ii) risk-pooling across a larger number of tax-payers tends to reduce 
the cost of risk  to zero, making EU funds highly desirable and sought after for public 
infrastructure development. This paper argues that private equity has not been forthcoming 
to the extent that had been expected by those propagating this method of finance. In those 
instances where private non-publicly guaranteed resources have been used, the distribution 
of risks between public and private partners remained asymmetric, with public governmental 
bodies carrying the financial risks, which ultimately may become a contingent liability for the 
country’s public finances. However, EU and European Investment Bank (EIB) public funding 
is used not simply because the risks are spread more widely, but rather because EU rules 
and regulations for using such funds lead to better preparation of projects and greater 
efficiency gains in project implementation and delivery. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A lack of infrastructure is proving a major constraint in sustaining and expanding Asia’s 
economic growth, in particular in (re-)  emerging fast-developing  countries such as 
India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, and Viet Nam. Inadequacies 
of economic infrastructure mean that it is more difficult to make growth inclusive for the 
poor, many of whom reside in remote and sparsely connected parts of their countries.  
Internationally,  interest in public-private partnerships (PPPs)  is growing because it 
seems to offer a solution that can overcome barriers to development due to a lack of 
infrastructure. Economic growth is to an important extent dependent on the 
development of infrastructure, particularly in transport and utilities such as water, 
power, and telecommunications. In addition, as countries develop, there is a need to 
improve social infrastructure for health and education, as well as many other facilities, 
including prisons. 
PPPs allow governments to expand the provision of services by using market tools, 
rather than publicly provided and managed facilities. It increases the number of 
services that can be provided within a given state budget and, more importantly, it 
increases their value in terms of quality and performance. In some areas, such as 
information technology and defense, the combination of public and private interests 
can create commercial value to some applications. 
In recent years several Asian governments have actively been promoting PPPs in the 
key infrastructure sectors of transport, power, urban infrastructure and tourism. 
Bringing in more private finance into key areas such as road building, waterways, 
power generation, seaports,  airports, etc. would increase the capability of 
governments to tackle infrastructure deficits. PPPs could be an effective means to 
enhance the financing of the long list of essential infrastructure projects across the 
east and south-east Asian sub-regions.  
The member states of the European Union (EU)  as well as the EU  institutions 
themselves  have been increasingly using  PPPs to accelerate  the development of 
ambitious trans-national infrastructure. To build the planned so-called Trans European 
Networks will require a financial outlay estimated in excess of €500 billion. For the EU, 
these are a central part of its strategy to integrate the economies of the EU and create 
an effective and functioning single market, able to reap the growth benefits associated 
with EU-wide economies of scale.  
This paper presents the EU’s rationale  for using PPPs and its experience, with 
numerous instances of successful PPPs using a wide variety of forms, does not offer a 
significantly different scenario from that of its member states. The novel feature is that 
the European Investment Bank (EIB)  can and does  provide a framework for co-
operation and tying together several national governments. It can provide a technical 
capability for authoritative risk assessments. It can also provide financial resources. 
However, the number of cases where significant additional risk-bearing resources from 
non-public entities remain comparatively limited. 
2.  RATIONALE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
USING PPPS 
In the last two decades there has been an important increase in the use of public 
private partnerships. The driver of these partnerships  is often limited public  funds 
combined with an increasing acceptance that the private sector is often better able to 




shown better ability in increasing quality and efficiency of services, due to the need to 
integrate risks into the planning process.  
One can summarize the reasons for implementing PPPs as follows: 
•  To provide additional capital; 
•  To provide better management and implementation skills; 
•  To provide more added value; 
•  To more efficiently allocate risks, thus improving the identification of needs and 
the optimal use of resources over the whole life of a project;  
•  The potential advantages of PPPs over traditional public procurement 
procedures are presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Potential Advantages of PPPs 
Acceleration of 
infrastructure provision 
PPPs allow the public sector to change the upfront 
capital expenditure of a project into a flow of yearly 
service payments, allowing projects to be delivered 
earlier and reducing public funding constraints. 
Faster implementation  The incentives by the private sector to deliver on 
time and according to specifications increase. 
Risks of design and construction are transferred to 
the private sector. Payments based on delivery 
and quality, or the need to charge user fees 
encourages efficiency and quality. 
Reduced whole life costs  While PPPs tend to be more expensive on paper, 
as these integrate risk costing, the final costs have 
been lower, as time and cost overruns have been 
cut considerably. 
Better risk allocation  A core principle of PPPs is the allocation of risk to 
the partner best able to manage it. 
Better incentives to perform  The allocation of risk to the private sector and the 
stricter links between delivery and the returns to 
the developers and operators increase efficiency 
and quality. 
Improved quality of service  Depending on the PPP used,  the private sector 
profit level may depend on the quality of delivery. 
Demand for the service and thus fee returns may 
depend on quality. 
Generation of additional 
revenues 
Due to increases in quality and efficiency the 
private sector may manage to increase profits, 
reducing the need of any subvention during the 
lifecycle of the project. 
Enhanced public 
management 
The involvement of private sector management in 
the public sector introduces (into the civil service) 
elements of performance benchmarking rather 
than the traditional delivery of services without 
seeking to achieve   value for money. 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Despite all these benefits, PPPs require a mature market with a well-developed private 
sector to ensure sufficient competition for the tenders. Contracting is complex, 
especially given the need to take into account the whole life cycle of the projects. The 
private sector does not have the same incentives as the public sector in the provision 
of public services, thus the specifications and outputs required from the public sector 
have to make commercial sense for the private sector. If there is a lack of 
infrastructure due to a market failure, the private sector will not participate if the social 




operator. Also, the level of risk may limit the interest of the  private  sector  in  large 
infrastructure projects, where returns only accrue in the long-term, increasing the risks 
of overestimating revenue streams. In some areas traditional public procurement is 
unavoidable, where the state finances, owns,  and operates the facilities, with the 
private sector only providing specific services for a short time.  
2.1  Risk distribution as a determining factor in the use of 
PPPs 
The distinguishing feature between standard public procurement procedures and 
different types of PPPs is the distribution of risks. The kind of risk-sharing used 
determines the type of contractual agreement. This has been reviewed in a European 
Commission document
1 on regional policy. It specifies which PPPs are most suitable 
for which kind of projects, developing a “best practice” guideline. Other public inter-
governmental institutions  such as the  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank seek to propagate the use of PPPs.
2
The kind of partnership between a public and a private  partner depends on the 
distribution of responsibilities on the following risks (see also 7.2 below): 
 
•  Construction risk
• 
 related to the design and the construction phase; 
Performance and availability risk
• 
 related to the (mis)match between the 
contractual specification and the final product;  
Residual value risk
• 
 where the market price of an asset at the end of the 
contractual agreement is lower than expected, for example the value of a 
public infrastructure asset when it  reverts to the public sector after the end of 
the concession to a private entity;  
Financial risk
• 
 linked to the interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations; 
Demand risk
• 
 related to the risk that actual use of the asset after completion is 
lower than expected with the project perhaps becoming non-viable if service 
charges are supposed to cover construction and/or maintenance costs; and 
Governance risk
It is important to emphasize that the first three of these types of risk are essentially of 
an additive nature. However, the latter three relating to financial, demand and 
governance risks are essentially of a multiplicative nature. This means that their 
impact on financial outcomes is likely to result in a much greater degree of uncertainty.  
, where the public authorities are unwilling or unable to adhere 
to the contractual obligations and stipulated terms and conditions. 
2.2  Choosing the right level of risk distribution 
The value for money of a PPP project depends principally on (i) the distribution of risks 
between the public and private sector; and (ii) the quality of the project preparation. It 
is clear that PPPs have the potential to reduce the expenses for the government or at 
least spread them differently over time. However, the potential of PPPs to be more 
cost effective and require less total expenditures is based on very specific conditions, 
generally known as the Arrow-Lind conditions.
3
                                                 
1 European Commission 2003. 
  
2 OECD. 2007  
3 We are here concerned with total costs including public expenditure and user charges. PPPs are often 




In a seminal article, these authors discussed “whether it is appropriate to discount 
public investment in the same way as private investments”. They concluded that “when 
the risks associated with a public investment are publicly borne, the total cost of risk 
bearing is insignificant and, therefore, the government should ignore uncertainty in 
evaluating public investments”
 4 This radical suggestion was based on the notion that 
the impact of publicly-financed investments on the tax burden of individual taxpayers 
was much smaller than the potential impact on shareholders of private companies. 
The authors proved that if the number of taxpayers were infinite, the costs of risk-
bearing “are negligible”.
5
This section analyzes the conditions for optimal risk allocation in a context of certainty 
as well as of uncertainty. Three important conclusions are derived. First, the risk-
spreading aspect of public investment, leading to a lesser risk-averseness than private 
investors, means that the optimal transfer of risk from public to private operators is 
fundamentally limited. 
 Of course, it will never be the case for a private equity 
investor that the number of shareholders will be infinite, and hence the attitude to risk 
will always remain fundamentally different. Private investors will therefore demand a 
higher risk premium than public-sector decision makers. The latter may indeed choose 
to follow Arrow-Lind’s conclusions and approach uncertainty as if it did not matter.  
2.2.1  Optimal risk distribution without Uncertainty 
From an accounting point of view, publicly financed infrastructure should be less 
expensive than private-sector financed infrastructure. The costs of construction and 
management should be the same for a project regardless who funds it. However, the 
private sector will require a profit and will demand high rates of return to cover the 
inevitable risks in complex infrastructure projects. Apart from the potential of spreading 
capital costs over time, there is no a priori reason for the Net Present Value of a 
project funded by the state to be more cost-effective than a privately funded and 
operated project. Only if wholly-publicly funded and operated infrastructure 
development is unable to achieve optimal efficiency in its management and resource 
use would PPPs be able to achieve cost-effectiveness. 
One of the main reasons is the different attitudes to risk taken by private operators, in 
accordance with Arrow-Lind conditions.
6
Depending on the project characteristics, the optimal level of risk-sharing differs. Some 
risks are so high and unpredictable that it often requires some risk to be retained by 
the public sector to attract any private sector involvement. Exchange rate risks are a 
classic example of these and may require the state to engage in swap-arrangements 
and other methods of hedging for future payments in different currencies. 
 Being more risk-averse than the state, 
private-sector project preparation is undertaken in much greater detail. In PPPs the 
difficulty for the authorities is to strike the right balance between risk distribution, the 
risk premiums of the private sector, and the level of detail in the contract specification. 
Poor decision-making and bad preparation with regard to any of those three may 
rapidly erode the efficiency gains from any PPP. 
The principal rule is that the risks are carried by the party most able to handle and 
minimize the risks. Avoiding construction delays and cost overruns is often  better 
handled by the private sector. However, the subsequent demand risk may be too high 
for the private sector to handle, with its requirement that profitability is high enough for 
repayment of capital and interests. This is particularly the case for public assets and 
services where demand is independent from private sector activity. For example, 
                                                 
4 Arrow and Lind (1970), p. 163. 
5 Arrow and Lind (1970), p. 174. 




motorway  building and maintenance companies have few, if any, instruments to 
influence the future level of traffic demand. 
The  “value-for-money” realized  is thus  a non-linear function of the degree of risk 
transfer from public to private operators. Figure 2 shows the relationship between risk 
premiums and savings due to efficiency gains of PPPs, assuming quadratic 
relationships. In this case, the analysis is straightforward. If the public sector and 
private sector had no efficiency differences, the total cost of a project would be 
cheaper than using private financial resources and private operators. The private 
sector exhibits Arrow-Lind behavior with higher risk aversion than the public sector and 
thus would demand higher risk premiums. A good example is a concession for an 
infrastructure asset where the state pays the operators according to demand. This 
could be a shadow toll for motorways. The payment would also need to cover the 
capital costs. The private financial sector and the operator would seek high risk 
premiums included in the shadow toll to take into account possible demand 




Figure 1: Allocation of Risks without Uncertainty 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
It has been demonstrated that the public sector tends to underestimate considerably 
the total costs of projects. This is due to the weak integration of risk factors in 
estimations. Thus the total costs have repeatedly (and generally systematically) 
exceeded initial estimations. This has been extensively reported and discussed in 
academic literature and attributed mainly to ‘optimism bias’ and the incentive of 
strategic misrepresentation of costs (see e.g.,  Flyvbjerg,  Skamris,  Holm, and Buhl 
2002 and 2005). Public operators are also generally considered to be less efficient in 
keeping costs down, because the profit incentive is missing. For that reason the 
financing, building and operating of infrastructure projects are better handled by the 
private sector, because the private sector has greater incentive to keep costs down 
and to account fully for risks.  
Due to the size of the outlay, the long-term lifecycle and the large number of different 
types of risks linked to large public infrastructure, the private sector will in general not 
undertake the development of infrastructure without public sector support or 
guarantees. The PPPs offer de facto  risk-sharing elements such as, for example, 
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guarantees on future revenues from operating the infrastructure, which makes  the 
private investment viable.  
Assuming that the total costs of a uniquely public sector development approach are 
known (i.e., certainty), there has to be a point of optimum risk transfer to the private 
sector. Initially, giving the private sector only very limited risk transfer at R1  will 
eliminate the private sector’s efficiency incentives, so that involving the private sector 
with a low risk transfer actually makes total costs (depicted on the y-axis) higher. 
Hence R1 represents the “worst” allocation of risk from the point of view of the public 
sector. As the degree of transfer of risk increases (a movement from left to right along 
the x-axis of Figure 2 above), so do the efficiency incentives of the private sector. 
Assuming non-linear quadratic cost functions, the decision makers will seek to ensure 
that the marginal benefits (MB) of the risk transfer exceed the marginal costs MC. In 
effect, this is the case where the additional cost savings are higher than the additional 
costs of paying the private sector a risk premium.  
The point of optimum risk transfer is where the MB = MC at R2 in Figure 2. With further 
risk transfers, to the right of this point, the MC of the additional risk premiums exceed 
the MB of the efficiency gains. Hence at point R2 we have the lowest total costs, in 
effect below TC2,  the costs which would have incurred without involvement of the 
private partners. This cost reduction, due to a PPP-approach, constitutes the ‘social 
profit’ of the risk transfer.  
2.2.2  Optimal risk distribution with Uncertainty 
However, there are various difficulties which decision makers encounter in the capture 
of this social profit through PPPs. The first is the inherent difficulty in estimating with 
certainty  ex-ante what the total costs of a publicly-built and operated infrastructure 
project will be. The second is the incentive of the private sector to seek lower risk 
transfer while negotiating high risk premiums (and hence profits). Badly negotiated 
deals could make the projects costlier and more inefficient than wholly publicly built 
and operated ones. Figure 3 seeks to demonstrate these uncertainties and the 
behavioural effects which can strongly affect the viability of a project.  
Figure 3 represents the case where the high premiums demanded by the private 
sector, as well as the uncertainty of the total costs of the project, affect strongly the 
benefits of risk transfers. The marginal cost curve shifts to the right, reflecting higher 
risk premiums demanded by private partners. Moreover, the marginal benefit curve 
may move to the right as well, reflecting the case in which the differences between 
private and public sector efficiency levels are  less pronounced. In general, one of 
these two effects would be sufficient to yield the outcome depicted in Figure 3 below.   
Figure 3 shows that the optimum risk allocation R3 under uncertainty is to the left of R2 
obtained above—greater uncertainty leads to demands for higher risk premiums and 
possibly lesser private sector efficiency gains. Hence, the optimal degree of risk 
transfer from public to private partners is less and involvement of the private sector is 
reduced. The case drawn in Figure 3 remains “special” in the sense that the resulting 
transfer of risks still leads to net efficiency gains for the public sector. The total costs 
for the public sector is within the error margin of the total cost estimation of the 
infrastructure—without public-private partnership the total costs would have been 
higher. This critically depends on the degree of shift of the marginal cost and benefit 
curves in response to uncertainty and the resulting behavioral responses of private 
sector partners. 




Figure 2: Allocation of Risks with Uncertainty and Behavioral effects 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
As discussed below, ensuring that the private sector offers a competitive cost for 
construction and operation can be ensured through competitive tenders. While for the 
level of interest charged by the private financial sector, the existence of strict selection 
procedures and solid loan guarantees can keep those down. The intervention of the 
EIB and the loan guarantee offered by the EIB in conjunction with the European 
Commission serves this purpose. Partial public co-financing can also reduce costs and 
risks for the private sector, but it also can reduce their efficiency incentives. 
However, in complex and large infrastructures, the contactors able to provide the 
necessary technical ability are few. In some countries there may only be one capable 
of performing the work. This gives the contractors the power to negotiate terms and 
this may ultimately lead to the erosion of PPP benefits. In the EU, the rules attempt to 
limit the power of contractors through tendering rules and by allowing bids from 
companies based in any EU member state. However, problems in procurement and a 
certain national bias in the selection procedures appear to persist even in the EU’s 
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internal markets. The transparency of procurement processes in a number of member 
states has been questioned. 
3.  PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS AND PPP EXTENSIONS 
The different models of PPPs are presented in Figure 3 and based on international 
nomenclature  as developed by the OECD and adopted by the EU. This figure 
represents the distribution of the project development and financial risks depending on 
the procurement agreement. Each PPP should try to ensure that risks are distributed 
to those parties best able to handle it.  
In the traditional public procurement the private sector can compete for bids for design 
and construction of public infrastructure, but beyond this the role of the private sector 
is limited. Nevertheless, there are extensions to the traditional  public procurement 
scheme. These extensions are (i) service contracts; (ii) operation and management 
contracts and leasing contracts. However, these extensions are rarely considered 
PPPs in a strict sense. 
Service contracts are a very limited and specific form of public-private co-operation 
used for simple short term operational requirements. The private sector procures, 
operates and maintains an asset for a short period of time. As the management stays 
in public hands this is to be regarded more as a method for the use of the technical 
skills of the private sector. 
Operation and management contracts transfer the responsibility for asset operation 
and management to the private sector. These are generally for a short period but 
extendable. The public sector bears the investment and financial risk, while the private 
sector is paid based on performance and the achievement of specific objectives. 
These agreements are to be found in the transitional periods of a privatization of a 
utility. 
In the case of Leasing we have for the first time the full transfer of risks to the private 
sector of maintaining an asset. The private sector buys the operation and 
management of an asset for a fixed period of time. The private sector will have the 
incentive to operate the asset efficiently to reduce costs while meeting the operational 
efficiency. The public sector risk stays in the areas of construction, capital 
improvement and financing. Leasing is suitable for infrastructure assets that generate 
an independent revenue stream, such as public transport.  
3.1  Turn-key procurement or Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
The aforementioned agreements, even if transferring some public sector operations to 
the private sectors, are only a very limited form of partnership with the private sector. 
When referring to PPPs, the first real form of partnership starts with BOT
7
While the public sector specifies in detail the standards and output quality 
requirements of the asset, the private party needs to consider how to reach the 
standards within the specified budget. Private parties need to take into account that 
any problems in design and construction will affect profitability during operation and 
maintenance.  
 or more 
complex agreements. In BOT agreements the private party bears the responsibility for 
the whole operational life of the project: design, construction,  and operation. The 
combination of these responsibilities under one single operator fosters efficiency 
gains.  
                                                 




From the public budget and expenditure point of view these BOT agreements help to 
avoid many of the known shortcomings and inefficiencies observed in publicly 
managed assets, including less rigorous financial discipline. Nevertheless, the public 
sector, having assumed the whole financial risk, needs to be extremely careful in the 
specification of standards and outputs. This form of PPP requires the public sector to 
finance the whole project cycle in full, which can extend over a period of 20 years. 
BOTs are often used for mass-transit or wastewater treatment plants. 
3.2  Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) 
A further type of PPP arrangement emerges when the financial responsibility in the 
form of concessions is transferred to the private sector. This is usually referred to as a 
Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) PPP scheme.
8
This is the most common and most attractive form of PPP and is frequently found in 
EU member states, particularly for transport infrastructure. This reflects that it transfers 
the financial responsibility to the private sector, reducing public outlays. The level of 
risk taken by the private party can be total, with the government having to intervene if 
the standards and outputs are not satisfactory, i.e., taking control, or issuing a fine or 
even appointing a new private partner/contractor.  However, more often than not 
governments do take a risk by guaranteeing that the private party is bailed out if 
overruns in project timing or costs affect the financial viability of the private party’s 
operation, or if demand risks after construction can make the project non viable. It is 
clear that in the case of large public infrastructures of national interest the bankruptcy 
of a private operator will in any case de facto force the government to take over control 
of the operation. This  reduces the risk for operators but also their incentive to be 
efficient. However, in projects with a long-term maturity and important risks, this may 
be the only way to ensure the private sector continues to participate in the provision of 
infrastructure perceived to be in the public interest. 
 In this case the whole lifecycle 
and the finances of the project are taken over by the private party. This form of PPP 
usually grants an operator the right to build and run a public facility over 25 to 30 
years, financing the investment through revenues generated by user fees, or 
alternatively shadow tolls i.e., payments by the state to the private operator based on 
the level of use of the asset. The private party will thus finance, build and manage the 
asset. It may be also be paid by the state in relation to its performance (e.g., shadow 
tolls based on the use of a motorway). Ownership of the asset will however remain in 
the hands of the state and it reverts to its control after the end of the concession. 
                                                 




Figure 3: Distribution of Responsibility/Risk According to Type of Procurement System 
 




Source: European Commission. 2003, p. 18 
3.3  Divestiture or Build-Own-Operate PPPs 
Divestiture is a different method of partnership where the government sells  shares of 
public assets to the private sector. This is usually the case with privatization processes. 
The difference with previously described forms of PPP is that the asset is now owned by 
the private sector. However, the state retains some control by regulating the activities of 
the company, e.g., avoiding monopolistic pricing, price discrimination, or the use of quota 
in the provision of the services. 
The level of divestiture is variable, with partial divestitures being very popular. The 
government transfers part of a public company’s assets, blending the responsibilities 
between public and private parties. This introduces private management and operational 
efficiency while protecting the public interest and national assets. There is no blue print for 
such arrangements and detailed ownership and operational arrangements vary case by 
case. 
In the case of BOO the government is transferring the full construction and management 
of a public asset to the private sector. This is the case were public services are given over 
to the private sector. The government, however, regulates the provision of the services.  
These groups of PPP mechanisms have many variants, and EU member states may use 
different acronyms. For example, in  the United  Kingdom (UK)  the DBFOs are called 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs). 
The effectiveness of alternative PPP structures is presented in Table 2 below. DBFO is 
perceived to perform better than alternative procurement models on effectiveness criteria; 
however, the implementation constraints are considered to be “very high”.  
Table 2: The Effectiveness of Alternative PPP Structures 






















Private Outsourcing  
Service 
Contracts   Possible   Yes   No   No   No   No   Low  
Management 
Contracts  
Yes   Yes   No   No   No   No   Moderate  
Leasing   Possible   Yes   Some   Possibl
e   No   No   Moderate  
Integrated Private Development  
BOT   Yes   Yes   Some   Yes       High  
Private Investment  
DBFO 
Concessions   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Very High  
Source: European Commission. 2003, p. 30 




4.  PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL PPP 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1  Procurement and the Development of Advanced Tendering 
Systems 
The tendering phase is essential to ensure that the quality of the outputs is the same as 
that of public provision. PPPs have the potential of blending public interest and private 
efficiency, but this potential can only be unleashed if the tendering and public procurement 
process are very well managed. It requires a very high degree of expertise by the public 
sector. 
To find the best contractors, it is necessary to have clear procurement regulators which 
inform properly the private sector and guarantee a level playing field in the process of 
awards. The tendering process has to be designed so as to maximize the benefit of a PPP 
relationship. This may mean that tendering processes may require separate stages and 
even complex pre-award discussions with companies to verify their capacity to deliver.  
For complex developments, the EU has started using negotiated competitive tendering, 
which includes negotiations on the details of the tender after a pre-selection with two to 
three frontrunners. This is sometimes necessary when the public sector is not able to 
specify in detail each aspect of the wished asset or service and the private sector is 
requested to propose alternatives. The negotiated procedure has been used 
internationally to seek the best value for money, allocate risk better, and encourage 
innovative solutions. 
Tender  procedures are complex and may be difficult to sustain for some companies. 
Depending on the project and complexity, the public sector may cover costs associated 
with the tender procedure, especially after pre-selection. A guarantee of intellectual 
property protection should be guaranteed for the innovations which the tendering party is 
offering. 
The allocation of risk is a cornerstone for efficient PPPs. Excessive risk for the private 
sector will damage the tendering procedure, and too little risk to the private sector may 
affect efficiency negatively. 
4.2  Legal and institutional requirements 
The development of successful PPP investments is influenced by a number of issues, in 
particular the legal framework and the availability of sufficient private enterprises with the 
know-how to perform the required works. Also, it is necessary that an “open economy” 
approach with national treatment is guaranteed in order to attract foreign companies. The 
lack of sufficient competition in tendering will result in a narrower choice of contractors, 
higher prices and the risk of not finding a sufficiently suitable private company, increasing 
the risk that the project objectives are not realized. 
The legal framework has to be conducive to private involvement, in particular if private 
funding is sought from international commercial lenders. The legal environment is of 
paramount importance. Even in the EU, some member states, especially the newest, have 
encountered problems in the regulatory sphere. Regulatory uncertainty  and 
unpredictability  will keep financial institutions at bay. The legislative and regulatory 
provisions need to be well developed and articulated before attempting to implement 
PPPs.  




There is a need to identify elements which would affect private sector participation, such 
as the viability of the project or market distortions. Public procurement regulations 
regulating  relationships between the public sector and the private sector need to be 
clarified especially those concerning the benefits and obligations for each party and the 
distribution of risks over the life cycle of the project. The public sector needs to have 
specific teams specialized in setting up PPPs, able to respond to the needs of specific 
projects. 
Some of the issues that need to be taken into account are the following: 
•  Legal capacity of the parties and the legal requirements of the state to provide 
services 
•  General legislation determining the role of the private sector in providing public 
services 
•  Legislation clearly setting the conditions for participation of foreign companies or 
financial institutions 
•  The existence of a legal basis for cost recovery mechanisms 
•  The ability to provide guarantees to the private contracting parties over the period 
of their involvement 
•  Clear land and property rights including intellectual property laws 
•  Clear land acquisition rules 
•  Planning permission requirements 
•  Licenses 
•  Transparency of national laws 
•  Administrative capacity to negotiate and follow the contracts 
•  Provisions for dispute settlement 
•  The role and requirements for any state finance participation 
•  Clear competition and antitrust legislation 
•  Clear labor and social security laws 
•  Clear tax and accounting liabilities 
•  Open and clear procurement procedures with very clear project specification 
requirements 
•  Rights to step in in the event of project failure and availability of alternative 
contractors 
•  Reputation (environmental, social) of the projects 
•  Credit standing of the public sector counterparty 
•  Certainty of the project cash flows to meet debt service requirements 
The above list of desirable preconditions has been adapted from OECD and European 
Commission guideline documents with some additions from interviews with specialists. 
In addition it is important to clarify requirements on environmental or social impact 
assessment, and in particular which requirements international lenders, especially 
institutional lenders such as the ADB, the  World Bank and  other  publicly financed 




Depending on the kind of uncertainties and foreseeable problems with some projects, 
specific provisions can be used to eliminate some of the risks for private contractors, 
maintaining however the incentives to provide the goods on time and at specified cost 
using  BOT PPPs or mixtures between BOT and DBFO. The European Commission 




Table 3: Advantages and Disadvantages of PPP Relationships 
PPP Type   Main Features   Application   Strengths   Weaknesses  
Contracting   • Contract with private 
party to design & build 
public facility • Facility 
is financed & owned by 
public sector • Key 
driver is the transfer of 
design and 
construction risk.  
• Suited to capital 
projects with small 
operating requirement. 
• Suited to capital 
projects where the 
public sector wishes to 
retain operating 
responsibility.  
• Transfer of design 
and construction 




May increase operational 
risk. • Commissioning 
stage is critical. • Limited 
incentive for whole life 
costing approach to 
design. • Does not attract 
private finance  
BOT   • Contract with a 
private sector 
contractor to design, 
build, and operate a 
public facility for a 
defined period, after 
which the facility is 
handed back to the 
public sector. • The 
facility is financed by 
the public sector and 
remains in public 
ownership throughout 
the contract. • Key 
driver is the transfer of 
operating risk in 
addition to design and 
construction risk.  
• Suited to projects that 
involve a significant 
operating content. • 
Particularly suited to 
water and waste 
projects.  
• Transfer of design, 
construction and 
operating risk • 
Potential to 
accelerate 
construction • Risk 
transfer provides 
incentive for 
adoption of whole 
life costing approach 
• Promotes private 
sector innovation 
and improved value 
for money. • 
Improved quality of 
operation and 
maintenance. • 
Contracts can be 
holistic • 
Government able to 
focus on core public 
sector 
responsibilities.  
Contracts are more 
complex and tendering 




required. • Cost of re-
entering the business if 
operator proves 
unsatisfactory. • Does not 
attract private finance 
and commits public 
sector to providing long 
term finance.  
DBFO   • Contract with a 
private party to design, 
build, operate and 
finance a facility for 
defined period, after 
which the facility 
reverts to the public 
sector. • The facility is 
owned by the private 
sector for the contract 
period and it recovers 
costs through public 
subvention. • Key 
driver is the utilization 
of private finance and 
transfer of design, 
construction & 
operating risk. • Variant 
forms involve different 
combinations of the 
principle 
responsibilities.  
• Suited to projects that 
involve a significant 
operating content. • 
Particularly suited to 
roads, water and waste 
projects.  
• As for BOT plus: • 
Attracts private 
sector finance; • 
Attracts debt finance 
discipline; • Delivers 
more predictable 
and consistent cost 




program; and • 
Increased risk 
transfer provides 
greater incentive for 
private sector 
contractor to adopt a 
whole life costing 
approach to design. 
Contracts can be more 
complex and tendering 
process can take longer 
than for BOT. • Contract 
management and 
performance monitoring 
systems required. • Cost 
of re-entering the 
business if operator 
proves unsatisfactory. • 
Funding guarantees may 
be required. • Change 
management system 
required.  
Concession   • As for DBFO except 
private party recovers 
costs from user 
charges. • Key driver is 
the “Polluter Pays 
Principle” and utilizing 
private finance and 
transferring design, 
construction and 
operating risk.  
• Suited to projects that 
provide an opportunity 
for the introduction of 
user charging. • 
Particularly suited to 
roads, water (non-
domestic) and waste 
projects.  
• As for DBFO plus: • 
Facilitates 
implementation of 
the “Polluter Pays 
Principle”; and • 
Increases level of 
demand risk transfer 
and encourages 
generation of third 
party revenue.  
• As for DBFO plus: • 
May not be politically 
acceptable • Requires 
effective management of 
alternatives / substitutes, 
e.g., alternative transport 
routes; alternative waste 
disposal options)  




5.  USE AND FINANCING OF PPPS IN THE EU 
The use of PPPs in the EU has been increasing since the early 1990s, with the UK 
pioneering the  process. It was soon taken up  by Portugal, Spain, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Denmark,  and Sweden, with other countries following suit. PPPs are 
generally perceived as having been a success and evaluations concord that PPPs 
have achieved higher levels of efficiency and a comparable and even superior service 
result compared with traditional public sector procurement methods. 
This positive performance, however, is built  upon certain strict regulatory and 
administrative prerequisites. If these are absent, there is a distinct likelihood that PPPs 
will be unsuccessful. 
5.1  The legal and institutional framework for PPPs in EU 
member states 
Each member state has a different approach to PPPs, and there is no overarching 
definition across the EU. It covers a wide range of contractual arrangements between 
the private and the public sector aimed at operating public infrastructure or delivering 
public services. While any PPP arrangement needs to fulfill the basic EU rules on 
public procurement to guarantee the proper functioning of the internal market, it is up 
to  member states  how to configure or regulate PPPs. Some countries posses a 
dedicated law or regulation, others a comprehensive legal PPP framework, and yet 
others  no  legal provisions at all. Several states have not yet gained  experience in 
PPPs, see Table 4. 
An important factor in the development of successful PPPs in member states is the 
existence of a  specialized unit promoting PPPs. “Partnership UK”  in the United 
Kingdom is at the forefront of promoting PPPs in the UK and abroad, and has adapted 
evaluation tools to measure their impact.
9
As emphasized above, the legal frameworks can influence positively or negatively the 
performance of PPPs. Successful PPPs are characterized by the transfer of financial 
risk totally or in part to the private  sector. This risk transfer is what makes the 
performance of PPPs superior, as private suppliers will tend to avoid running into time 
and cost overruns, even if PPPs do incorporate a risk premium. In Spain, however, 
legislation on PPPs exempts the private sector from  risks by spelling out that  the 
government always maintains responsibility in contracts involving the public party. 
 In the new member states  there is,  for 
example,  the  recently established  “PPP Centrum”  in the Czech Republic, created 
specifically for such purposes. 
 
                                                 
9 Comprehensive information on PPP use in the UK can be found at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/ 














   
Austria  ▲▲▲    Cyprus  ▲▲   
Belgium  ▲  ■■ 
Czech 
Republic  ▲▲  ■■ 
Denmark  ▲▲    Estonia    ■ 
Finland    ■  Hungary  ▲▲  ■ 
France  ▲▲  ■■  Latvia  ▲▲  ■■■ 
Germany  ▲▲    Lithuania  ▲▲  ■ 
Greece  ▲  ■■  Malta  ▲▲   
Ireland  ▲▲▲  ■■■  Poland  ▲▲  ■■■ 
Italy  ▲▲  ■  Slovakia     
Luxembourg  _    Slovenia  ▲  ■ 
Netherlands  ▲▲▲    Bulgaria  ▲▲  ■ 
Portugal  ▲▲  ■■  Romania  ▲  ■■ 
Spain    ■■■  Candidate countries: 
Sweden      Turkey  ▲▲  ■■■ 
UK  ▲▲▲         
Source: Adapted from PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2005) 
5.2  European Commission Guidelines for PPPs 
The decision to use or not to use PPPs lies in the hands of member states. The EU 
through its funds for structural development and the European Investment Bank are 
ready to co-finance projects which use the form of PPP for delivering public goods. 
The EU is neutral as to whether or not public authorities choose to provide a public 
service themselves or entrust it to a third party. The form it is adopting, whether using 
normal public procurement, concessions or PPPs, is also for the member state to 
decide. However, the involvement of private parties in public works or services is 
regulated at EU level. 
The law on public procurement and concessions aims to create an internal market in 
which the free movement of people, goods, services, as well as the right of 
establishment and the principles of equal treatment, transparency,  and mutual 
recognition are guaranteed. While for PPPs the rules on public procurement and 
concessions are considered sufficient, the European Commission has produced an 
interpretation of the rules specifically for PPP.  The current legislation  on public 
procurement is the following: 
Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, 
transport, and postal services sectors (30.04.2004)  
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public 
supply contracts and public service contracts (30.04.2004)  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1564/2005  of 7 September 2005 establishing 
standard forms for the publication of notices in the framework of public procurement 
procedures pursuant to Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council  
In addition to the directives and regulations on public procurement, the Commission 
has issued Communications to clarify the application of this legislation on PPPs. In 
2004 it launched a green paper combined with a public consultation to find issues that 
▲ Need for PPP unit 
identified and some action 
taken (or only a regional 
PPP unit existing) 
▲▲ PPP unit in progress (or 
existing but in a purely 
consultative capacity) 
▲▲▲ PPP unit existing 
(actively involved in PPP 
promotion) 
■ Legislation being proposed 
■■ Comprehensive legislation 
being drafted / some sector 
specific legislation in place 
■■■ Comprehensive 




have to be resolved at Community level on PPPs. This was followed by two 
Communications interpreting Community law for PPPs. Those are: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European  Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
Public-Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement and 
Concessions (COM/2005/0569 final) 
Commission interpretative Communication on the application of Community law on 
Public Procurement and Concessions to Institutionalized Public-Private Partnerships 
(IPPP), C(2007)6661 
There are many formats for PPPs used in the different countries. The EU legislation 
distinguishes mainly between two systems, the institutional PPPs and contractual 
PPPs. The first are characterized by the creation of an institutional joint company, a 
single purpose company or vehicle held by the public and private parties jointly. For 
the specific agreements the European Commission used the international 
nomenclature  (OECD)  for its own analytical purposes, but member states  are not 
required to use this nomenclature.  
6.  RISK AND THE INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY 
The different parties in a PPP agreement have different objectives. In some cases 
PPPs are not possible if public sector  goals  are not compatible with those of the 
private sector. In the case of universal service provision, for example, the private 
sector is not prepared to make losses to ensure that there is universal coverage with 
an infrastructure asset or service. In such cases, funding and demand risk has to be 
borne by the state.  
Table 7 identifies the different requirements of the partners in an agreement. 
Depending on what kind of project is planned, this can clarify the kind of approach to 
be taken. 
It is clear that the private sector seeks profits while the public sector has 
considerations relating to maximizing  social welfare as well as equity. The public 
sector has therefore  an  obligation  to ensure that services  for the population  are 
improved,  projects are concluded faster, and  state budget expenditure is  reduced. 
There are thus a number of areas where public and private sector interests  may 
converge. 
PPPs  involving private financing are also likely to require loans from international 
financial institutions such as the EIB in Europe, ADB in Asia, or the World Bank, as 
well as from  commercial banks. Such institutions require rigorous analysis of the 
financial returns of the project and the capabilities of the private contractors. 
6.1  Financial Implications of Risk 
Risk will determine the level of participation by the private sector as well as costs, as 
risk will be integrated in the form of a risk premium by the private contracting party. 
Revenue risks are the most fundamental factors affecting the private sector. Utilization 
levels and user fees or tariffs determine the future viability of a project. Depending on 
the sector,  historic price data  may or may not exist. For roads, traffic data, future 
potential, and willingness to pay are all used to assess the viability of a project. But 
there are always risks in the final estimates. The existence or quality of parallel routes 
may affect considerable future revenues. Often shadow pricing of tolls with additional 





Pricing of the potential contractors in the tender procedure also needs prior precise 
costs studies to be carried out by the state. To calculate whether bidders are putting 
forward reasonable figures (neither unreasonably and unrealistically low nor too high) 
there is a need for public sector comparators, based on similar projects previously  
undertaken by the state. This would help evaluate the value for money of proposed 
projects. 
It has to be noted that experience partially contradicts the rules on risk distribution. 
There is in practice hardly any PPP where risks are fully transferred to the private 
sector. This is due to the public service nature of the projects financed. A collapse of a 
public service cannot be accepted. Governments around the world have usually bailed 






















 Fair Profit   Required   Required   Required   Required   Required   Required   Required  
Reward for Risk 
Mitigation   –   –   Desirable   Desirable   Required   Required   Automatic  
Clear Legal / 
Regulatory Structure   –   –   Required   Required   Required   Required   Required 
 Growth Potential   –   –   Desirable   –   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable 
 Political Support   –   –   Desirable   Desirable   Required   Required   Required 




             
 Leveraging Funding   –   –   –   Yes   Important   Important   Important 
 Accelerating Project 
Implementation   –   –   –   –   Important   Important   Important 
 Improving Service 
Levels  
Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Improving Service 
Coverage   –   –   –   Important   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Efficiency Gains   Important   Important   Important   Important   Important   Important   Important 
 Ease of 
Implementation   –   –   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable  
Lender 
Requirements 
             
Rigorous Financial 
Analysis  




–   –   –   –   Required   Required   Required  
Certainty of Grant 
and State funding  
–   –   –   –   Required   Required   Required  
Clear Legal regulator 
structure  
–   –   –   –   Required   Required   Required 
 Technical Ability of 
Owner/Operator  
–   –   –   –   Required   Required   Required 
 Political Stability   –   –   –   –   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable  
 




6.2  Type and allocation of risks 
The public sector also runs risks by having to award to a company a public infrastructure 
development or service which in the end it may not be able to deliver. Another risk is that 
large contracts for long periods may create a monopoly provider in the private sector which 
will impact costs and quality. Finally, corruption can cause severe impacts on selection, 
costs and quality. 
Construction risks for large infrastructures are important. Cost overruns and delays have 
been common in public sector procurement. In PPPs, however, these have been 
considerably reduced when the private sector has borne the costs of such risks. The tender 
will include a risk premium, but the overall costs of the project are often lower as the private 
sector tends to avoid overruns more efficiently. 
For international operations foreign exchange risk  is a considerable problem. Project 
viability can be affected if lenders are foreign. For developing countries this risk is not 
negligible. 
Regulatory / contractual risk is a problem for the private sector. Governments may change 
their contractual terms. This is a risk especially for sensitive issues such as user fees. In 
some cases, public opinion on the infrastructure and the service charges may prompt the 
government to renege on its agreement. Such situations may cause strains also with 
financial lenders. 
In some countries, political risks  are considerable. These are not only to be found in 
countries with unstable political systems, but also in stable democracies. Infrastructure 
assets that have the potential to attract popular opposition, such as waste incinerators or 
roads and motorways, may create enough pressure for politicians to renege on their 
position; this is a public acceptance risk. When such risks exist, private contractors will 
require compensatory guarantees or risk insurance which adds to the cost of the project.  
Unforeseen  environmental  concerns during project development or archaeological 
findings may also create calls to take mitigating actions which should be taken into account 
in the provisions of the PPP agreements. 
Latent Defect risk may appear in privatized infrastructure assets, when concessions are 
given to improve and maintain existing infrastructures. The state of these assets  may be 
worse than anticipated adding to costs. 
Hidden Protectionism private contractors are concerned over preferences by public 
officials, often these are preferences to offer the contracts to national companies. 
Sometimes these preferences are caused by popular political pressure. Foreign contractors 
are sometimes mistrusted. This has occurred in the new member states. The Commission 
considers the popular opposition to the involvement of a foreign company as the cause for 
the abandonment of a concession for a motorway in Hungary. Interestingly the Commission 
notes that open public procurement, instead of reducing opposition to foreign participation, 
increases it, probably due to lack of information when contracts are awarded in  a  less 
transparent manner. Proper public procurement and PPPs should be carefully prepared and 
consulted with civil society if there is a risk of disruption. Table 9 summarizes the EU’s 





Table 6: Typical Allocation of Risk 
Risk Category   Allocation   Comment  
Planning Risk   May be retained by contracting authority 
for pilot projects. However, there may be 
occasions when transfer in whole or part 





Transferred to contractor through payment 
mechanism  
Contractor bears risk of cost and time 
overruns. Contracting authority retains 
risk of changes to output specification  
Operating Risk   Transferred to contractor under DBO, 
DBFO and concession contracts through 
payment mechanism.  
Deductions are made from payments 
for failure to meet service requirements  
Demand Risk   Often retained by contracting authority or 
shared. May be transferred under DBOF 
and concession contracts where the 
contractor can control demand and 
forecast revenues with reasonable 
certainty.  
An example of demand risk transfer is 
when the contractor recovers its costs 
through user charges (e.g. road tolls).  
Residual Value 
Risk  
Retained under DB and DBO contracts 
May be transferred under DBFO and 
concession contracts to ensure fitness for 
purpose throughout the duration of the 
contract  
Contractor carries residual value risk if 
asset not automatically transferred to 
contracting authority at end of contract  
Other Financial 
Risk  
Other financial risk often transferred (or 
shared) under DBFO and Concession 
contracts  
An indexation mechanism may be used  
Legislative 
Risk  
Legislative risk often retained (or shared). 
Government is often best placed to control 
regulatory and legislative risks  
Key issue is whether the regulatory or 
legislative change is discriminatory in 
respect of the specific project or sector  
Source: European Commission. 2003, p. 85 
6.3  State budgeting of PPPs 
One of the questions which had to be addressed by  the EU is whether  a PPP can be 
considered as ‘off budget’ and hence outside of the public balance sheet. This has important 
implications in public expenditure reporting and thus for the determination of the budget 
deficit. Within the EU, all budget deficit reporting is central because of the budget deficit 
criteria of the EU, especially for members of the Euro zone. The financial reporting (or not) of 
PPPs has therefore both economic and political importance.  
PPPs can be off balance sheet if the private sector bears most of the financial risks of the 
PPPs. Concessions with user fees fully financing the project and with demand and 
construction risks can be treated off balance (Figure 3 presents a schematic view). 
Projects where finance is private and the risks are fully held by the private sector are not to 
be included in the government budget. 




Budget decision tree on DBFO contracts 
 
 
Source: EIB 2004, p.20 
6.3.1  Projects on balance sheet upfront 
DBOF projects where the public sector partner carries the construction risk in relation to the 
project or carries both the availability and demand risk have to be budgeted up front.  
If the DBOF project is on the Government’s balance sheet, then the full construction costs 
count against the government budget over the construction period. The capital element of 
the subsequent annual payments by government does not affect the budget balance but the 
interest and service charge element does. 
Yes 





PPP is private 
investment 





Will the partner 








Will the partner 
bear the demand 
risk? 




Design, Build, Finance (DBF) projects where the contract between the private sector partner 
and the government has the characteristics of a financial lease i.e. the government is 
effectively buying rather than hiring the asset and the balance of the risks and rewards of 
ownership lie with the government. 
Projects that do not involve private sector finance. These could be either:  
a) Conventional public procurement projects; 
b) Design, Build, Operate (DBO) projects or 
c) Design, Build (DB) projects.  
6.3.2  Projects off balance sheet with payments spread over the period of 
implementation 
For DBOF projects where the private sector partner carries the construction risk and carries 
either the availability or the demand risk in relation to the project, the balance sheet will not 
be affected upfront but the impact will be spread over the PPP contract period. The same 
applies to Design, Build, Finance (DBF) projects  where the contract between the private 
sector partner and the government has the characteristics of an operating lease i.e. the 
government is effectively hiring rather than buying the asset and the balance of the risks and 
rewards of ownership lie with the private sector partner. 
In this case, during the construction period there is no impact on the budget balance or the 
national debt. However, after the construction period and during the operating phase, the 
government budget balance and the government debt are worsened by the amounts of the 
regular unitary payment paid by government to the private sector partner.   
6.4  Hybrid PPPs and state budgeting 
In some cases a project may be partially funded by capital grant from government and the 
balance funded by user charges. Government grants do not necessarily bring a project on 
balance sheet provided they do not cover the majority (more than 50%) of the capital cost. In 
cases where the capital grant from government exceeds 50% of the total capital cost, the 
asset will be recorded on the government’s balance sheet over the construction period and 
will therefore affect the government budget over  this period. However, the government 
budget and debt impact will be reduced by the imputed value of the sale of the concession to 
the private sector partner. The net impact on the budget upfront will therefore be the value of 
the capital grant paid to the  private sector partner. The user charges will accrue to the 
private sector partner as they are paid and will have no impact on the government budget 
(except where there is gain-sharing provided for in the contract). 
6.5  Performance of PPPs in the European Union 
Reviews of PPPs in the EU were performed for the European Parliament (2006a and 2006b) 
and present the stages of adoption across EU countries. The mix of first movers can appear 
strange at first sight. On the one hand  there are countries which are economically and 
administratively very developed and,  on the other  hand,  poorer Mediterranean cohesion 
countries
10
                                                 
10 Cohesion countries in the EU are those which have an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
below 90% of the EU average. The present cohesion countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Spain 
is eligible for a phasing-out period after losing this status in 2006.  
. The wealthier and mostly Nordic countries considered the PPPs as an option to 
increase the value for money for the provision of public services. These counties considered 
that the private sector is able to deliver a certain number of goods more efficiently than the 




cohesion countries, PPPs were necessary to implement ambitious heavy infrastructural 
investment programs (especially in transport) which would not have been possible to finance 
through the public sector alone. However, PPPs were rarely used to cover the co-financing 
requirements of EU funds, but rather to finance other public projects, sometimes separate 
parts of a single project. This will be further discussed below. 
Today the most advanced users of PPPs are not always those who started earlier. These 
are the UK, France, Ireland, Germany, and Italy. These advanced users have expanded 
PPPs to many sectors, including healthcare, education,  and prisons  and  have  the 
appropriate legal and regulatory tools, as well as specialized task forces to ensure that PPP 
expertise is developed and centralized. 
It is estimated that in the EU (also including Norway and Turkey) PPP deals between 1995 
and 2004 were estimated to be worth US$120 billion. Of that total, the UK accounted for two-
thirds, while Spain and Portugal each accounted for 9%–10% (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Average 2000 to 2005 PPP Activity as a Percentage of Mean GDP 
 
Source PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2005, p.37 
The UK has the largest program of PPPs, with 800 projects signed since 1992. The most 
common form of PPP is the PFI, with 650 developments worth a total capital value of £59 
billion to date (data from UK HM Treasury, March 2008). The PFIs have the characteristic of 
being financed by the private sector completely with the public sector only providing 
technical and legal support. According to the EIB (2004) public procurement in the UK 
represents 25% of all PPPs in the EU. While the UK uses PPPs across the government 
expenditure portfolio, other countries use PPPs mainly for transport infrastructure, but they 
are being extended to other sectors, in particular to water, health and education.  
The share of PPP in EU public expenditure has not yet been estimated in any detail, but that 
PPPs are nevertheless sparingly used can be inferred by the estimates for the UK for 
2004/05 fiscal year (Sawyer, 2005). The value of PPPs in total public expenditure was less 
than 1% of public expenditure. However, using public investment after depreciation and 
asset sales as an indicator, one can estimate that the £4 billion directly contracted over the 
period represents a sixth of the total £22 billion public investment.  
Other countries have been less enthusiastic in  embracing  PPPs. In some  countries, 
transferring development and management of public infrastructures to the private sector runs 
counter to established public policy traditions. The transfer of healthcare, education or prison 
facilities to the private sector has encountered considerable resistance from citizens of some 
member states. For some utilities and transport infrastructure such popular constraints do 
not exist, but the administrative structures do not promote it. The vast majority of public 
infrastructure is still funded by public (national or EU) resources through traditional public 




administrative requirements combined with a prevailing view in some quarters that normal 
procurement methods can be cheaper  keeps some public authorities away from embracing 
PPPs.  
The “intermediate adopters” of PPPs are Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, where PPPs 
have been successfully used mainly in major infrastructure projects. In these countries the 
extension to other sectors has been hampered by political or administrative barriers. Greece 
has implemented some advanced PPPs for the building of Athens airport, roads and leisure 
faculties, but there is an absence of PPP initiatives in all other sectors. Figure 5 presents the 
use of PPPs in EU member states by sector. 
Among  the group of “latecomers” to PPPs, such as Luxembourg or Sweden,  the main 
argument cited against the use of PPPs is the aforementioned resistance to allow the private 
sector to intervene in the public domain. It is also the case that the better management of 
public finances and larger public resources in such countries reduce the need for embarking 
on the often difficult route of PPPs to provide public services. Even within member states 
there are differences across regions. 
For the new member states, the PPP experience has been mixed and not immediately 
successful. Initially, PPPs were considered an appropriate solution given budgetary 
constraints in the public sector and the possibility to spread costs over the whole life cycle of 
a project and avoiding the need to finance the construction phase.  Favorable lending 
conditions from international financial institutions encouraged this position. The use of PPPs 
has, however, been very limited. The main problem has been the difficulty in overcoming 
human resource deficiencies and administrative capacity. Some of the most common causes 
of  problems were inappropriate risk evaluations and the overestimation of potential final 
demand
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Some of the reluctance to use PPPs originates from within the European Commission itself, 
in particular the Directorate-General for Regional Policy. Its position with regard to PPPs is 
still lukewarm. By contrast, the DG responsible for Trans European Networks is actively 
promoting PPPs. The large discrepancy in budgetary means between the two institutions 
may well be a central reason for this divergence in position.  
. 
Most member states and the EU institutions have largely preferred a public finance only 
approach to infrastructure development, due to its relative simplicity. The EU provides 
considerable structural funding to poorer member states, either as grants, which for some 
countries can cover over 85% of costs or through loans by the EIB. However, with 
infrastructure requirements exceeding the joint capacity of EU support and national funding 
and with pressures to control public deficits, member states and the EU institutions have 
increasingly experimented with PPPs. The EIB has been of great help in providing the 
technical knowledge and necessary guarantees to attract private funding. 
Usually PPPs are only considered where EU structural support is low compared to project 
size, such as is the case of Trans European Networks (TENs) in wealthy EU countries, 
where support is in the order of 10% of costs. In poorer member states with support covering 
up to 85% of public expenditure, PPPs are not encouraged as pressure to comply with 
expenditure timescale restrictions discourages the lengthy and complex PPP procurement 
and financial engineering requirements involved. Most of the efficiency gains and risk 
transmission to private operators is also lost when a large part of the infrastructure is 
financed by the public sector and thus risk transfer to the private sector is very limited. 
                                                 




Figure 5: Use of PPPs in EU member states by sector  
 





7.  USE OF PPPS FOR EU CROSS-BORDER 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
The use of PPP financing for cross-border infrastructure is a complex subject. The EU does 
not have a stated preference for PPPs, and it is in the hands of member states how to 
finance and run public projects. Hence, the use of PPPs varies considerably between 
member states. The use of PPPs has in effect been quite limited. In fact, most national 
governments view PPPs as a last resort, as these are time consuming and complex to 
prepare.  Many  TEN  projects in poorer member states and regions  are financed by a 
substantial contribution from EU funds. Thus the use of hybrid PPPs where public alongside 
private funding is involved is discouraged. Many wealthier member states avoid PPPs, with 
the exception of the UK and to a certain extent France and Italy.  
The fact that co-financing of transport infrastructure can cover up to 75% (in some cases 
85%) of costs in cohesion countries
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What seems to be recurrent practice is to use different procurement systems for different 
sections of a project, such as transport projects. This means that a road from A to C through 
B is financed from A to B by public funds (EU funds and national) and from B to C through a 
PPP. For other infrastructure, such as water treatment plants, public funds may cover the 
construction, while the network itself is financed through private funds. The private sector 
then operates the whole system and uses  fees to recover the capital investment and 
operational costs of the whole project, excluding the public grants. While this simplifies some 
of the administrative issues, it goes counter to the idea of a PPP containing the whole life 
cycle of an integrated infrastructure asset, blending capital and operational costs. One of the 
reasons that DPFOs offer value for money is that they reduce the risk of time and cost 
overruns. 
 discourages the use of private funding for remaining 
costs. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) the way funds are officially reported 
discourages the combination of private funding with EU funds, even if the regulations do not 
exclude the use of private financing for “cohesion” projects. 
Also worth noting is that in most cases, cross-border infrastructure is treated differently on 
either side of a border. Member states have their own administrative and financial systems 
to develop infrastructure in their territory and  there is often little coordination between 
countries. Cases where cross-border infrastructure has been treated as a single joint project 
are very rare, but the EU has created a supranational regulation allowing for European 
companies. Not originally designed for this purpose, this regulation has facilitated the 
implementation of cross-border projects as a single operation. 
7.1  Suitability and effectiveness of alternative PPP structures  
The various forms of PPP all have advantages and disadvantages and are more or less 
suitable depending on the project. PPP structures are not a “better” solution to traditional 
procurement per se and have a number of significant drawbacks, particularly the rigorous 
requirements imposed on the tender procedure. Ultimately, the final choice will depend on 
the project contents and the sector of activity. 
The case of transport infrastructure. Transport was one of the first areas where PPP was 
used. The decision to use a PPP as well as its type will partially depend on the potential 
profitability of the infrastructure asset. Traditional or BOT procurement systems are generally 
used where the public sector finances the totality of the infrastructure asset and the public 
sector will pay user fees based on the performance of the private sector, but taking over the 
                                                 




demand risk. There is also another variant were the construction phase is in the hands of the 
private sector, but the public sector pays the fees over the operational period based on the 
private sector’s performance. It is for the private sector to achieve the quality of service 
contractually required. 
For motorways, DBFO could be based on a toll system. This is the case in projects which 
have long-term profitability. The private sector finances,  maintains,  and operates the 
motorway, repaying construction costs from toll returns. Tolls can be real or shadow tolls. 
Shadow tolls are payments by the state which are based on the use of the motorway, thus 
demand risk is in the private sector even if the public sector actually pays the whole lifecycle. 
With real tolls, the public sector transfers all the risks to the private sector and does not use 
public resources. Of course shadow tolls have disadvantages: as motorists do not pay for 
usage costs, allocation of resources may not be rational.  
For small transport infrastructure projects PPPs are not recommended, unless bundled in a 
larger contract. 
The case of water projects. The wastewater treatment and water distribution sectors have 
seen the participation of the private sector for a number of years. The EU has introduced 
very high standards in the water sector
13
In addition to transport and water infrastructure PPPs have been increasingly applied in the 
health and education services, where the private sector has financed and built facilities in 
exchange for a maintenance and operational contract for  an  extensive  period after 
completion. 
 resulting in substantial capital requirements. Many 
countries are looking at PPPs to find the resources and expertise to handle the costs and 
operational needs. The reasoning behind the choice of PPP is similar to the transport sector 
and depends on the size of the projects, the ability to charge users and risk transfer. There is 
a tendency to transfer costs fully to water users to ensure the rational use by consumers, 
which favors a DBFO concession type of PPP with user charges. The public sector is 
increasingly less suited to operating the complex treatment processes. 
7.2  Hybrid PPPs in the EU: mixing grants with private funding 
EU regulations for structural funds, cohesion funds, pre-accession funds or Trans European 
Transport Networks (TEN-T)  allow for EU grant support to be co-financed by public or 
private funding. The use of financial PPP mechanisms to co-finance EU grants has however 
been scant.  
The use of EU grants in PPPs has its strengths and weaknesses. Grants can add to the 
viability of a project, but increase the burden of the national authorities in a PPP procedure 
as the objectives of EU funds also need to be taken into account. The EU Commission has 
guidelines on the use of EU funds for infrastructures.  
The concession of grants should in theory only occur if the financial viability of an 
infrastructure project of national and EU importance is not assured, thus not allowing a full 
PPP. In practice, however, grants have not been assessed according to the viability of the 
infrastructure under PPP arrangements. 
Due to limitations in public budgets, especially in the new member states, there is an 
increased interest in mixing EU grants with private funding, such as to reduce the burden on 
the public budget for co-financing the operations. Hybrid PPPs are thus considered as ways 
to avoid national public expenditure contributions to infrastructure rather than making the 
projects viable for the private sector. There is pressure to commit EU funds to projects to 
                                                 
13 The EU has advanced and stringent drinking and waste water directives setting standards for all member 




avoid losing the annual budgeted amount or the return of any under-spent amounts two or 
three years after committing to a project
14
To a certain extent, the existence of an EU grant can attract private funding to the project. 
Project viability risks are reduced as well as political risks. On the downside, the efficiency 
gains of a PPP with a full lifecycle costing are partially lost and user fees and returns to 
investors will  be  distorted. The EU attaches  conditions  to the grants which can cause 
difficulties in reaching agreement on private involvement, in particular on restrictions in the 
level of profits for the private sector as grants for private infrastructure have strict limits on 
the level of profits from user fees. This is designed to discourage the public or private sector 
to rely unduly on the benefit of an EU grant. Concessions thus allow only for user fees that 
cover maintenance of the infrastructure, recovery of the costs from lending and a small 
determined margin of profit. Unfortunately, this also implies that user fees attached to any 
infrastructure developed with EU funding cannot incorporate the real cost of the 
development, which runs counter to economic theory on optimal use of infrastructure.  
. 
EU strategy on private sector profit requires that the private sector does not receive profits 
resulting from the receipt of a grant. Figure 6 describes the European Commission’s 
objective, which is to eliminate from the charges of the operators undue profits (Y-X) 
generated by the additional social impact from B to C of the grant. This requires a calculation 
of what the benefits for the private operator would be in the absence of the project grant.  
The  diagram shows three outcomes where the negotiation totally or partially eliminates 
profits generated by the grant. Payments should limit the profits to the line X, which is based 
on the repayment of the privately-financed capital and normal profits in the absence of a 
grant. When the price negotiated is above the optimal, the final social benefit or value for 
money, however, may be lower or higher. This depends on the way users are charged. If 
payments are based on actual tolls, higher payments would reflect better the costs of the 
project and the use would be more rational. In transport it could reduce pollution increasing 
social benefits. It is for the public sector to determine the level of charges. Of course, with 
shadow tolls or other public payments to  the operator over the lifetime of the project, 
payments should avoid being in excess of level X. 
                                                 
14 As a basic principle, the n+2 rule (n+3 for a transition period in new member states) requires that annual grant 
funds offered to member states need to be committed to projects in that year’s budget and spent within two to 




Accounting for Private Sector Excessive Profits. 
 
Source: Adapted and expanded version from European Commission (2003), p. 62 
For new EU member states the initial tendency in any case has been to match EU funds 
directly to public funds, not leaving any space for private funding. This is partly because of 
lack of knowledge about PPPs within public administrations. In practice, even if PPPs were 
considered, the administrative capacity of the countries and the lack of appropriate 
bureaucratic procedures have impeded private involvement in infrastructure projects. Hence, 
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Standards   –   –   –   Relevant   Relevant  
Maximizing Societal 
Benefits  
Relevant   Relevant   Relevant   Important   Important  
Transparency / Open 
Competition  
Relevant   Relevant   Relevant   Important   Important  
Reasonable Control of 
Grant Funds   –   –   –   Required   Required  
Avoiding Undue Private 
Profit   –   –   –   Required   Required  
Efficiency Gains   Desirable   Desirable   Desirable   Important   Important  
Leveraging Private 
Funds   –   –   –   –   Yes  
 
Source: Based on European Commission 2003, p. 18 
Note: For partial or full divestiture the requirements are the same as for DBFO concessions 
Hybrid PPPs using EU funding also have additional particularities. Although member states 
are responsible under strict EU guidelines for the approval and implementation of projects, 
for large infrastructure projects the EU has prior control in the approval process (this is for 
cohesion funds for transport infrastructure projects costing over €50 million and €25 million 
for environmental infrastructure). In the case of infrastructure funds for candidate countries 
to the EU, the European Commission always exercised prior implementation control, limiting 
considerably the room for manoeuvre of governments. The new Instrument of Pre-accession 
Assistance to candidate countries, (IPA), introduces better shared responsibilities in the 
approval and implementation of projects with a gradual transfer to national authorities. This 
is to improve the smoothness in the introduction of EU practices.  
However, there are barriers in the use of hybrid PPPs, especially for DBFOs, even though 
these are increasingly used to spread the costs of infrastructure over time. This allows the 
initial costs to be carried by the private financial sector which is then repaid through yearly 
service charges which cover the repayments and interest  from loans and a service fee for 
the operator, e.g.,  in relation to shadow tools. Unfortunately, such arrangements are 
discouraged if EU funds are used. First EU co-financing rules do not allow covering 
operational expenditure, although this can be circumvented as it is, in effect repaying capital 
expenditure. The most difficult barrier is the multiannual framework of the EU budget. The 
EU budget is a very rigid instrument which is agreed for seven years without the flexibility of 
national budgets. The EU cannot commit funds beyond these seven-year periods, creating a 
budgetary risk for the national government and the operator. The restrictions placed on EU 
expenditure discourage DSFO PPPs linking payments over the life of the project. 
8.  THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK IN 
PPPS 
The European Investment Bank (EIB)  was  established by  the European Economic 
Community in 1958  with a mandate to lend money to the public and private sectors for 
projects of European interest, such as: 
•  Regional cohesion and convergence 
•  Support for SMEs 
•  R&D and innovation 




•  Environment 
•  Energy 
The EIB is a non-profit making and policy driven bank and limits its activities to offering long-
term loans for investment projects.  
The EIB is owned by the member states of the EU and they jointly contribute to its capital, 
each country contributing in relation to its economic weight within the EU. The subscribed 
capital in 2007 was €164.8 billion. The statutory lending ceiling is set at 250% of subscribed 
capital.  
Liquidity is monitored with a view to matching disbursement needs. Consistently earned 
profits are generally transferred to reserves and policies and controls are in place to manage 
risk. 
As EU member states are the shareholders of the EIB, it carries the highest credit rating of 
triple-A (AAA). Hence, the EIB can easily raise capital at very competitive terms. The EIB 
cannot lend more than 50% of the total cost of any individual project.  
The projects which the bank invests in have to be in line with EU objectives, and these must 
be sound economically, financially, technically, and environmentally, and should be able to 
attract other sources of funding. The EIB is an autonomous institution of the EU and it makes 
its own decisions purely on the merits of each project.  
8.1  Role of the EIB in European PPPs 
The EIB has traditionally borrowed to co-finance public infrastructure developments in 
member states,  especially those receiving  EU regional development grants. It has also 
borrowed for projects outside the EU. The bank concentrates its efforts on poorer member 
states and in 2005, 93% of its signed loans were granted within the enlarged EU with a large 
part benefiting from guarantees from member states or public institutions.  
In 2006 the EIB lent €45,7 billion; with 87.1% of this amount going to EU member states, 7% 
to enlargement countries, 3% to Mediterranean neighbors, 1.8% to ACP-OCT-South Africa
15
The EIB has no specific preference for lending to public or private funds  but has been 
promoting a larger use of PPPs. The bank promotes its role as a complementary financial 
intermediary alongside other funders, i.e. commercial banks and capital markets. Many EIB 
loans to PPP projects are either bank-guaranteed or monoline-insured.  
 
and 1.1% to Asia and Latin America (EIB data). 
The bank is very attentive to credit tests and is known for its conservative approach to the 
quality of projects. EIB involvement in any project is considered as a strong guarantee for 
commercial banks in their decision to finance parts of a PPP.  
Many PPPs are underpinned by public sector support; often some components of the risks 
are fully borne by the public sector, such as demand risks, which reduce the EIB’s risks and 
also the risks borne by the private sector financier. 
The role of PPPs has been steadily increasing in the EIB’s portfolio: over €20 billion since 
2006 (despite a fall in 2004–2005, Figure 6), but this only accounts for a small fraction of EIB 
lending , which is mostly given over to the co-financing  with public funds. 
                                                 
15 ACP: African Caribbean and Pacific, OCT: Overseas Countries and Territories. The twenty-one 
OCTs depend constitutionally on four of the EU Member States: Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
and the UK. OCT nationals are EU citizens. However, these countries do not form part of Community 
territory. Accordingly, Community law does not apply directly to them but they benefit from associate 
status conferred on them by the EU Treaty. 




Figure 6: Value of PPP Signatures per Year, million € 
 
Source: EIB (2005), p.21 
A very large share of the bank’s lending has focused on transport, even if other sectors have 
increased in importance over recent years, such as significant investment in education and 
health in the UK (See figure 7).  
Figure 7: Breakdown per Sector 
 
Source: EIB (2005), p.21 
The median loan maturity of transport projects is 20 years. An overall breakdown by maturity 
is presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Exposure to PPP Projects by Loan Maturity to end 2003 
 
 
Loan Maturity  
   
Exposure Signed 
(nominal)  
(EUR m)  
  
% of total 
Up to 19 years   2,490   17%  
20 – 25 years   8,580   58%  
26 – 30 years   3,339   23%  
Over 30 years   312   2%  
 Total   14,721   100%  
Source: EIB (2004), p.8 
Table 9 below offers a sectoral breakdown of the EIB portfolio of PPPs by sub-sector, with 
roads and motorways taking the lion’s share followed by urban development, renovation, 




Table 9: European Investment Bank Loans for PPP Projects 1990–2003 by Sector 
Sector  Contract Amount  % of total
(Euro million)
Roads and Motorway 9120 62.1%
Urban Development, Renovation, and Transport 2600 17.7%
Airports 999 6.8%
Traditional and High-Speed Trains 997 6.8%
Social Infrastructure (education and health) 549 3.7%
Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution 258 1.8%
Drinking and Waste Water treatment 165 1.1%
 
Source: Evaluation of PPP Projects financed by the EIB. Synthesis Report. Appendix I, p.32 
The EIB has a positive influence on the stability and added  value of the projects it co-
finances. The bank offers long loan maturities and capital grace periods which are 
particularly appropriate for large infrastructure projects. This improves the affordability of the 
investment for the public sector, but also for potential private lenders. The solid analysis and 
input of the EIB in project appraisal and selection has also increased the economic quality of 
projects. The bank does not sell project debt until maturity, contrary to common practice with 
other lenders. 
As an impartial not-for-profit organization, the bank participates closely in the whole project, 
from design to selection of contractors and monitoring. The EIB has developed flexible 
financing structures for PPPs and adapts the financial system to the needs of the project. 
The bank has reinforced specific procedures for facilitating PPPs. One area is the extension 
of different financial mechanisms and of securitization to facilitate the participation of private 
lenders.  
The EIB also has set up a Structured Finance Facility (SFF), in order to match the types of 
funding to the requirements of projects with a high-risk profile. This facility assists in pursuing 
its equity financing and guarantee operations in favor of large-scale infrastructure schemes. 
The EIB had total reserves of €750 million over the period 2004 to 2007 for the purpose of 
generating operations amounting to between €1.5 billion and €2.5 billion, providing a broad 
mix of financial products: 
•  senior loans and guarantees incorporating pre-completion and early operational risk;  
•  subordinated loans and guarantees ranking ahead of shareholder subordinated debt;  
•  mezzanine finance, including high-yield debt for industrial companies in transition 
from SME scale or in the course of restructuring;  
•  project-related derivatives. 
The aim of the SFF is increase the added value of priority projects by complementing the 
commercial banks and capital markets.  
8.2  Impact of PPPs on the EIB 
The increasing importance of PPPs in the EIB has required an increased  in  the bank’s 
appraisal, structuring and negotiating capacity. The appraisal of risks requires the 
coordinated work of different parts of operational branches of the bank. The analysis of the 
promoter’s technical and market studies, in-house assessment of risk and the capacity to 
perform detailed analysis of the technical merits of contracts is necessary. 
The bank has had to increase its monitoring capacity, in particular in cases where projects 
rely on revenues from the asset. The increased demands also needed proper integration in 




The EIB’s success in operating in the EU is partially due to the EU’s solid regulatory 
framework and the relatively low political risks involved when lending to projects linked to EU 
objectives and national objectives which are underpinned by the support of governments in 
the beneficiary countries.  
The imposition by the EU of public procurement rules to member states has facilitated the 
work of the EIB, avoiding the need for the bank to create the basic structures of public 
procurement in each country and every case. The member states can rely on the guidance 
of the EU and the assistance of other member states in developing the needed structures. 
The bank nevertheless advises the countries on adapting the procurement procedure to the 
needs of PPP contracts. 
9.  ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF PPP IN THE EU  
Four case studies have been selected for their particular characteristics and the different 
lessons than can be drawn from them. The text concentrates on these lessons rather than 
the details of the project development. The case studies chosen are: the Channel Tunnel 
Rail Link between France and the UK; the Beiras Litoral and Alta Shadow Toll Road, 
Portugal; the M5 tolled motorway, Hungary; the Perpignan Figueiras Rail Concession, cross-
border link between France and Spain; the Trakia Motorway Project, Bulgaria.
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9.1  The Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) 
  
The Channel Tunnel rail link is a good example of a highly complex and very costly cross-
border project. Interestingly, the planning and financing of the service and the UK side of the 
development were undertaken separately to the French side of the construction. France has 
provided the rail tracks and the French Eurotunnel company was set up to use half the 
tunnel’s capacity. The trains themselves are made in France using tested TGV
17
This paper only discusses the British side of the Channel Tunnel. This was envisaged as a 
PPP concession, with the private sector designing, building, financing and operating the 
CTRL for 90 years. Initially,  Eurostar was owned  and  launched by SNCF, SNCB
 technology. 
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The first part of the CTRL was completed in 1993. However, passenger numbers were less 
than half expectations. These were vastly overestimated and also did not take into account 
the emergence of low-cost airline companies. LCR would not be able to recover  the 
investment. However, as a private initiative, the planning permission only  mentioned  the 
private consortium LCR as promoter. The government could not offer state aid without  the 
European Commission’s approval.  
 and 
British Rail. In June 1996, the UK operations were sold to London & Continental Railways 
(LCR). In October 1996, LCR changed the name to Eurostar UK Ltd (EUKL).  
Finally, a complex refinancing  agreement was agreed in which LCR would complete the 
project and sell it to rail operator Railtrack, which was formerly  state-owned but is  now 
privatized. LCR obtained guarantees form the UK government on financing the design and 
construction work. Unfortunately, Railtrack was unable to finance its operations and had to 
be taken into administration by the government. In 1998 LCR awarded a management 
contract to Intercapital and Regional Rail, owned by the National Express Group, SNCF, 
SNCB and British Airways. 
                                                 
16 The main source of information is the European Commission’s Resource Book on PPP case studies from 
2004. For the Bulgarian Trakia concession, recent reports have been used. 
17 Trains à Grande Vitesse—French for Fast Speed Train 




While the CTRL was completed with a delay of seven years and at a cost of £5 billion, it is 
important to note the positive points: private engineering and building companies were able 
to deliver results on time and in budget. It was the rather weak estimates on passenger use 
and lack of financing for the development of links with the remaining rail network that 
affected the project. In fact the government did not link the CTRL properly to the national rail 
grid, nor did it develop other high speed train routes within the UK. The TGV which in France 
and Belgium was able to run at 300 km/h had to reduce speed to 140 km/h in the UK. After 
the eventual completion of the CTRL trains were finally able to run at 270 km/h in the UK. 
Interestingly enough, difficulties  in the airline sector due to prolonged security controls 
combined with shortening train travel times have increased the demand for Eurostar 
services. Nevertheless only ten million passengers a year were expected in 2010, compared 
with the original forecast of 21 million.
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9.2  Beiras Litoral and Alta Shadow Toll Road, Portugal 
 
Portugal is a frontrunner in the use of PPPs for infrastructure. One of the country’s projects 
was a 167km motorway which links with the Spanish road infrastructure. The government 
launched bids for a PPP DBFO, where the recovery of costs is handled with shadow tariffs 
based on vehicle distance usage. No EU funds were used, but the project was supported by 
an EIB loan.  
Problems started at an early stage. The government did not specify clearly standards of 
quality and service in the tendering process. This meant alterations to the specification at 
later stages affected the bidding process. This caused delays and led to a repetition of the 
tendering process. Final costs turned out to be three times the original estimates and 
shadow tolls had to be raised as a consequence. 
Costs estimates from bidders were not assessed well because there were no public sector 
comparators. It was thus not possible to assess if the PPP was offering a better outcome 
than traditional public procurement.  
The mishandling of precise specifications and requirements meant that the government 
subsequently had to cover the delays and costs of implementing environmental Impact 
assessments as a result of which projects were adapted. The private operators cannot be 
blamed for these administrative errors.  
The increases in shadow tolls due to the larger-than-expected costs meant that the state 
budget from the highway agency was unable to cover the shadow toll payments. This has 
prompted the government to introduce actual tolls. Luckily usage of the highways is high and  
toll cost requirements are therefore sustainable. 
In the meantime Portugal has created a specialized unit for PPPs to avoid similar problems 
with future PPPs. 
9.3  M5 toll motorway, Hungary 
The M5 toll motorway is an important part of the Trans European Network. Interestingly, the 
PPP uses no EU grants. The sources of funds have been equity from the concessionaire 
AKA as well as loans from the EBRD and commercial banks. The concession transferred all 
risks to AKA but emergency provisions were agreed.  
Construction was a success, completed in 1997 on schedule and even ahead of schedule 
for some sections. However, traffic volumes were below expectations as road-users diverted 
                                                 
19 In November 2010 the British Government sold a 30-year concession to run the rail tunnel to a Canadian 
pension fund for £ 2.1 billion. Industry sources estimated that usage of the tunnel was still one-third below its 




to national roads to avoid tolls. AKA thus had to request support from the revenue shortfall 
mechanism provided in the agreement to operate the motorway. This allows for AKA to draw 
support from the state for several years, repayable after debts to senior lenders have been 
repaid and if revenues allow.  
In 2004 the toll system was changed to a vignette system, where users buy a permit to use 
motorways for a specified period of time, e.g. a week, month or year. The motorway is thus 
now financed through availability payments, independent of traffic flows, thus eliminating the 
user risks of the operator. 
9.4  Perpignan—Figueiras Rail Concession, cross-border link 
between France and Spain 
While not yet completed, this cross-border rail link is a good example of a successful PPP 
with very complex institutional challenges. This link is part of the Trans European Network 
and it is considered a priority to link the Spanish to the French and European rail networks.  
A BOT concession was developed and a European Company was set up. The design of the 
project is in the hands of the two countries and the private sector will build and operate the 
link for 50 years. A substantial subsidy consisting of an EU grant and state subsidies will be 
provided which cover 57% of the construction costs. The remaining funds have to be offered 
by private partners, in the form of own equity and commercial loans.  
Interesting in the agreement is that the private party will be levying fixed tolls to train 
operators,  tolls  which are publicly  approved.  Maintenance  standards  and availability 
performance are set very high, with penalties for non-performance, including termination of 
the contract.  
This PPP is presented as a flagship example of how to set them up in a highly complex 
infrastructure challenge in a cross-border area. The procedure was robust and took into 
account the specific needs to draw in technically apt bidders. Standards have been set high, 
the state subsidy allows for the private sector to take on risks which would not be possible 
without such support. Thus the state does not transfer the whole costs, but it does transfer 
demand and availability risks.  
9.5  Trakia Motorway Project, Bulgaria 
The Trakia motorway negotiations for a concession for a motorway stretch of 190 kilometers 
recently collapsed. Negotiations have been difficult and have gone on for several years. The 
start of construction is more than two years behind schedule. 
The Trakia motorway is an important link between the capital and one of the major town and 
ports of the country, Burgas. Other parts of the motorway have already been completed. The 
reason for the recent collapse of the negotiations is to be found partially in the external 
market environment. While the Bulgarian government  had awarded a concession to  a 
Bulgarian-Portuguese consortium, this consortium has failed to obtain private finance. Given 
the credit crunch and rising interest rates, the banks’ perspective of the project’s forecasts 
and profitability have been affected. A deep crisis in the present government and the 
freezing of substantial amounts of EU support to the country under allegations of fraud also 
makes it difficult for the PPP to be easily renegotiated.  
The Trakia motorway concession process was complex and arduous and suffered from 
considerable problems and delays due to administrative mismanagement of the tendering 
procedure which was investigated by the EU. Initial government guarantees violated EU 
state aid rules. Once these barriers were removed, however, the reduced availability of 
private credit, reflecting the fall-out from the “sub-prime”  financial crisis has effected  the 




Political instability, the already complex uncertainties of the project and the credit crunch 
have led to guarantees and the risk premiums for commercial banks being raised. The banks 
are pulling out as the state is not in a position to renegotiate the agreement. The new 
guarantees and demands also put into question the viability and the value for money 
arguments for the use of a PPP rather than normal procurement.  
10.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
This discussion paper has analyzed the conditions for optimal risk allocation within PPPs in 
a context of certainty as well as of uncertainty. Three important conclusions can be 
observed.  
First, the risk-spreading aspect of public investment, leading to less risk-averseness than 
private investment, means that the optimal transfer of risk from public to private operators is 
fundamentally limited.  
Second, the larger size of the EU budget and its specific methods of funding through a share 
of VAT indirect taxes will indeed mean that the perception of risks borne by individual tax-
payers tends to be negligible, although these are definitely not zero. Irrespective, neither the 
EU nor the EIB, assume high risks in their investment or co-financing of public infrastructure 
in the EU. Whereas the budget of the European Communities contributes grant funding to 
trans-national infrastructure, the lending policy of the EIB tends to be quite conservative and 
assume low, if not zero, risks. In all cases, final contingent liabilities remain with national 
governments rather than supra-national institutions.  
Third, the main contribution of the EU to trans-national infrastructure appears to be ensuring 
that the marginal benefits of private sector involvement—in effect efficiency gains—remain 
quite high. Grant funding for feasibility studies and preparation, combined with supra-
national coordination and regulation have meant that the quality of project and investment 
preparation has remained high.  
The EU continues to pursue ambitious plans to develop the Trans European Networks. The 
costs are estimated over two decades to exceed €500 billion.  For this reason, the EU 
institutions and member states have increasingly explored the use of PPPs to achieve the 
needed infrastructure development.  
PPPs have demonstrated themselves to be generally less costly than normal procurement 
due to the increased efficiency of the private sector. In the EU, however, PPPs are still 
limited in number, due to their complexity and in many cases a lack of administrative 
experience in this field. Setting up PPPs for large infrastructure projects is complex and 
mistakes in the development process can create higher costs in the future than normal 
procurement. The use of PPPs has thus been highly variable across countries and even 
regions within countries.  
For large infrastructure projects planned for crossborder operations, PPPs pose a particular 
challenge. Transfer of risks to the private sector is hampered by the large scale and long-
term horizons involved. Governments thus have to offer important guarantees, such as 
demand guarantees, or grants. The failure of a private operator of a large public 
infrastructure asset forces the state to take over its operations. Failed PPPs will ultimately 
always be taken over by the public sector. 
Another area of concern for the public sector is the possible failure of PPPs due to changes 
in the financial sector, such as changes in the risk premiums due to financial crises. 
PPPs can potentially allow countries to develop infrastructure faster and at lower cost, but 
PPPs are not a panacea, bringing with them also higher risks of failure if project details, 




agreed. Governments need thus to create specialized units to handle the process and often 
hire specialized consultants. 
In Europe, the European Investment Bank has played a pivotal role in organizing PPPs for 
European projects. By handling difficult procurement systems, such as competitive tender 
procedures and helping to develop administrative capacity, the EIB has become a point of 
reference for large and complex  projects. The involvement of the EIB in infrastructure 
projects presents clear guarantees to private financial institutions of the viability and quality 
of projects, leading to reduced risk premiums. The EIB also offers credit guarantees. In this 
particular sense, the EIB does provide a useful role model for the Asian Development Bank’s 
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